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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LOGAN CITY, j 
Plaintiff and Appellee, | Case No. 920739-CA 
vs. j Case Type: Appeal 
LOWELL D. CARLSEN, \ Priority No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953 as 
amended.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether Logan Municipal Code Section 9.24.040 is in 
conflict with general state law, or is repugnant to state law, 
and based thereon whether Appellant's conviction of violating the 
same should be overturned. 
2. Whether the trial court's treatment of Appellant's 
motion to dismiss and Appellee's motion to amend the information 
prejudiced appellant or violated his substantial rights. 
3. Whether Appellant is precluded from challenging the 
1 
constitutionality of Logan Municipal Code section 9.24.040. And 
if Appellant is not so precluded is the ordinance 
unconstitutionally vague and therefore void. 
4. Whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to 
sustain the jury verdict. 
5. Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose 
sentence because of a delay in sentencing that went well beyond 
30 days following the trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with furnishing tobacco to a minor 
under the age of 19 years old, in violation of Logan Municipal 
Code section 9.24.040. 
A jury trial was held in this matter on the 16th day of 
January, 1992 in the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, in 
and for the County of Cache, Logan City Department, the Honorable 
Roger Bean presiding. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The court entered 
judgment on the 6th day of October, 1992. 
Appellant is appealing from that verdict and judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The transcript lists the testimony of Appellant and 2 of the 
Prosecutions 4 witnesses, therefore, critical facts are omitted 
in the transcript, however a brief list of the critical, 
uncontroverted facts are as follows: 
1. Jerren Barson, a 16 year-old boy, acting under the 
direction of the State Health Department and the Logan City 
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Police department attempted to purchase cigarettes from 20 stores 
in Logan City during a routine compliance check. (Transcript 
p.71, 75.) 
2. At Appellant's business Appellant, Lowell Carlsen, sold 
cigarettes to him. (Transcript p.73, 98, 101.) 
3. None of the other 19 business sold cigarettes to Jerren 
Barson despite his requests for the same. (Transcript p.75.) 
4. With respect to the interaction Jerren Barson had with 
Lowell Carlsen, Jerren testified as follows: "I went up there and 
asked for a pack of Camel Lights and he [Appellant] goes, sare 
you 19?' And I didn't say nothing. Then he just gave them to me 
with a pack of matches, and then I went back to the car." 
(Transcript p.7 3.) 
5. With respect to Jerren's testimony referred to above in 
paragraph no.4, Lowell Carlsen's only dispute was that he 
testified Jerren lied about his age indicating he was 19. 
(Transcript p.95.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant has not met his burden on any of the points he 
raises to justify receiving any favorable treatment from this 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 9.24.040 IS NOT IN 
CONFLICT WITH GENERAL STATE LAW, IS NOT REPUGNANT TO 
STATE LAW, AND THEREFORE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF 
VIOLATING THE SAME SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Municipal corporations have authority from the State 
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Constitution to adopt and enforce ordinances "not in conflict 
with the general law . . . ." Article XI, Sec. 5. The 
Legislature has further granted to cities and towns power to 
"pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not 
repugnant to law . . . ." U.C.A. Sec. 10-8-84 (1953 as amended.) 
A municipality can enact and enforce ordinances that are 
consistent with relevant state law. 
This appeal presents a case where the Logan City ordinance 
enforced against Appellant is consistent in every respect with 
state law except for the penalty provision codified under a 
different title. 
Appellant was prosecuted and found guilty by a jury of 
furnishing tobacco to a minor in violation of Logan Municipal 
Code Sec. 9.24.040 which provides that "It is unlawful for any 
person to sell, give or furnish any cigar, cigarette or tobacco 
in any form to any person under nineteen years of age." The 
ordinance does not specify a penalty. However, in section 
1.16.010 the following general penalty provision is given: "All 
violations of this municipal code for which no lesser penalties 
are provided, are classified as class B misdemeanors, punishable 
by a fine not to exceed the sum of one thousand dollars, or by 
imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed six months or by 
both such fine and imprisonment." 
The comparable statute under Utah law is found in U.C.A. 
Sec. 76-10-104 (1953 as amended) which provides in almost 
identical language to the city ordinance: "Any person who sells, 
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gives, or furnishes any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form, 
to any person under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor on the first offense, a class B misdemeanor on the 
second offense, and a class A misdemeanor on subsequent 
offenses." 
The Appellant was charged as a first offense. Under the 
city penalty provision the offense is a class B misdemeanor but 
under state law is a class C misdemeanor. Appellee admits that 
the city penalty provision, section 1.16.010, is void or 
unenforceable because it is not consistent with general state 
law. Appellee maintains, however, that the separate ordinance 
which defines the objectional conduct, which Appellant was found 
guilty of violating, section 9.24.040, is completely consistent 
with state law and should not be held invalid 
A. UNDER THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN ALLGOOD V. 
LARSON SECTION 9.24.040 OF THE LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE 
SHOULD BE FOUND VALID AND APPELLANT'S CONVICTION 
UPHELD. 
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with a situation similar to the 
immediate case in Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976.) 
In Allgood. the defendant was arrested, charged and convicted of 
trespassing under a Salt Lake City ordinance. The city ordinance 
provides "that it shall be unlawful for any person to walk upon 
the premises of another without permission of the owner or 
occupant." Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City section 32-3-3. 
Like the immediate case, the Salt Lake City trespassing ordinance 
does not provide for a penalty. However, section 26-1-8 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City provides that when there is 
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no other penalty prescribed, the person "shall be punished by a 
fine not exceeding $299, or imprisonment in the city jail for a 
period not longer than six months, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment." 
The trespass Allgood engaged in is an infraction under state 
law which clearly cannot result in imprisonment, U.C.A. sec. 76-
6-206(3). Allgood was, however, under the city ordinance, 
sentenced to six months in jail. On a habeas corpus preceding 
the district court ordered that Allgood be released from custody. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's action and 
held: "if the ordinance penalty conflicts with that of the 
general law of the state covering the same subject, the ordinance 
penalty is void. The charter or ordinance penalty cannot exceed 
that of the state law." Allgood, 545 P.2d 530, 532 (Emphasis 
added.) 
The court in Allgood, as Appellant in the immediate case 
concedes, did not find the trespass ordinance, section 32-3-3, 
void but merely the separate penalty provision, section 26-1-8, 
which provided for jail time. 
In the immediate case Appellant's attorney moved the court 
to dismiss the charges based on the inconsistency between the 
state and city penalty provisions. The trial court Judge, Rodger 
Bean, denied the motion but, consistent with Allgood, determined 
the city penalty provision was invalid and sentenced Appellant 
under general state law as a class C misdemeanor. The court 
believed there was no prejudice to Appellant. (Sentencing 
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Transcript p.8) 
Appellant's sentence was to pay a $300.00 fine (including 
the state assessment) and serve 30 days in jail. The judge put 
Appellant on 6 months informal probation and agreed to suspend 
$100.00 of the fine and all the jail time upon successful 
completion of probation. 
From every perspective, Defendant has been treated as though 
he committed a class C misdemeanor. The Verdict form signed by 
the jury foreperson, included in Appellant's brief, shows he was 
convicted of a class C Misdemeanor. His sentence was for a class 
C misdemeanor. He has received all benefits of the more lenient 
law, the state law. There has been no prejudice against him or 
violation of any of his substantial rights. 
B. A SAVINGS CLAUSE CONTAINED IN THE LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE 
WORKS TO FURTHER PROTECT THE VALIDITY OF THE CITY 
TOBACCO ORDINANCE. 
Section 1.01.100 of the Logan Municipal Code provides for 
the severability of the penalty provision, section 1.16.010, in 
order to protect the substantive provision, section 9.24.040, 
which makes furnishing tobacco to minors a criminal offense. 
Section 1.01.100 provides: 
If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of 
this code is for any reason held to be invalid or 
unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the 
validity of the remaining portions of this code. The 
council declares that it would have passed this code, and 
each section, subsection, sentence, clause and phrase 
thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more 
sections, subsections, sentences, clauses or phrases had 
been declared invalid or unconstitutional, and if for any 
reason this code should be declared invalid or 
unconstitutional, the original ordinance or ordinances shall 
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be in full force and effect. 
Even though the Code suggests it is acceptable to remove 
objectionable clauses and phrases within a section or subsection 
this court is not asked to do that. All of section 9.24.040 is 
consistent with general state law and should be upheld. Section 
1.16.010 is admittedly inconsistent and should be voided in this 
case. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S TREATMENT OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND APPELLEE'S MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION 
DID NOT PREJUDICE APPELLANT OR VIOLATE HIS SUBSTANTIAL 
RIGHTS. 
During the trial, Appellant moved the court for it's order 
dismissing the information filed against Appellant because of the 
conflict, discussed above, between the penalty provision of the 
city ordinance and the relevant state statute. In response to 
Appellant's motion Appellee offered to amend the information to 
change the charge from a city ordinance to state statute. It was 
discussed that such a motion would also require amending the 
plaintiff from the City to the State. The court took both 
parties' motions under advisement and in the interest of the 
witnesses' and jury's time proceeded with the trial. (Transcript 
p.48-53, 58-68.) 
The motion to dismiss was raised again at the conclusion of 
the presentation of Appellee's case. And, again, Appellee's 
proposed amendment was discussed. The court indicated that it 
would tentatively grant the prosecution's motion to amend the 
information in order to get the factual questions to the jury. 
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The court made it clear however that the motions were still under 
advisement, (Transcript p.88-92.) 
At the conclusion of the case, and before actually deciding 
the parties motions, the court instructed the jury in the 
following fashion: 
There are a couple of things we've done. We've amended 
the pleading to show State of Utah as the plaintiff. 
We won't explain to you all of the reasons for this. 
It shows State of Utah as the plaintiff in the action 
rather than Logan City. Mr. Wyatt's role here is a 
representative of the State of Utah, and that's 
permitted under the statute at this present time. 
Another change is that the offense is a Class C 
misdemeanor, and you'll be instructed in these 
instructions to that effect rather than a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
(Transcript p.109.) 
At the conclusion of the trial the court indicated it would 
announce a decision on the 2 motions, both Appellant's motion to 
dismiss and Appellee's motion to amend, at sentencing which was 
to be set at some time in the future. (Transcript p.112-13.) 
At sentencing the court denied both motions including 
Appellee's motion to amend. (Sentencing Transcript p.4.) The 
result was that the information was never actually amended. It 
was suggested to the jury that the amendment was granted when the 
court told the jury that it changed the plaintiff to the State 
and the charge to a class C misdemeanor. The court did not 
explain to the jury the basis for what it was doing to avoid 
confusion. 
Appellant's argument here is that it was improper to grant 
Appellant's motion to amend. The argument is misplaced as the 
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court did not grant such a motion. The Appellant's only real 
argument here would be that he was prejudiced in some significant 
way by the court's telling the jury the plaintiff had been 
changed from the City to the State even though it had not. 
Appellee's position here is that the court's conduct in 
tentatively granting the motion, while keeping it under 
advisement, and then actually denying the motion did not 
prejudice the defendant or violate any of his substantial rights. 
Ill 
APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE 9.24.040 
Defendant raises for the first time on this appeal a claim 
that the ordinance he was charged and convicted with is 
unconstitutionally vague. Appellant did not raise this issue at 
trial, and therefore, should be precluded from doing so here. 
Nevertheless, if the court chooses to allow him to raise the 
argument here Appellee maintains the ordinance is not 
unconstitutionally vague. 
A. APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO RAISE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE TO THE CITY ORDINANCE DURING THE TRIAL 
PRECLUDES HIM FROM DOING SO ON THIS APPEAL. 
Case law is clear: "Generally, a defendant who fails to 
bring an issue before the trial court is barred from asserting it 
initially on appeal. Utah's appellate courts have applied this 
rule to constitutional questions advanced for the first time on 
appeal." State v. Archambeau, 820 P,2d 920, 921 (Utah App. 
1991.) 
The fact that Appellant did not raise this issue at trial 
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should preclude him from raising it at this late date. The 
courts have, however, two limited exceptions to the general rule 
barring Appellant from raising an issue for the first time on 
appeal. The first exception is if the trial court committed 
"plain error;1' the second is if there are "exceptional 
circumstances." Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 921. 
1. THIS IS NOT A CASE OF EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Appellant argues there are "exceptional circumstances" 
because he was "not given adequate notice that he would be 
prosecuted under the statute." (Brief p.30.) Appellant is 
apparently claiming that the so-called amendment, which was not 
actually granted, to change the charge from City ordinance to 
State statute created the exceptional circumstances. Appellant 
was prosecuted and tried for violating the City ordinance, the 
same ordinance the original information alleged he violated. 
Even if the information had been amended to state statute the 
language of the prohibited conduct in the two ordinances are 
virtually identical. (See discussion above.) It is Appellee's 
position that this is not exceptional circumstances as 
contemplated by Utah courts. 
2. THIS IS NOT A CASE OF PLAIN ERROR. 
Appellant also argues "plain error" by concluding the court 
committed plain error. Appellant does not however, offer 
anything specific as to what the plain error was. 
None of the Appellant's substantial rights were violated 
here. His liberty interests are not a stake. Appellant should 
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be precluded for raising this issue for the first time on appeal. 
B. LOGAN MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 9.24.040 IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE OR AS APPLIED TO 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Even though Appellant should not be allowed to raise the 
issue of the constitutionally of the ordinance, Appellee 
maintains it is not unconstitutionally vague. 
Appellant has a difficult burden here. "Legislative 
enactments are presumed to be constitutional, those who challenge 
a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of 
demonstrating its unconstitutionally." Greenwood v. North Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 818 (Utah 1991) 
In Greenwood the court provides guidance for a challenge of 
vagueness. "In challenging the ordinance on its face, plaintiffs 
must show that it is 'invalid in toto—and therefore incapable of 
any valid application . . . .' Unless the enactment is vague in 
all its applications, it is ordinarily not unconstitutional on 
its face. in that case, we must then determine whether the 
ordinance is vague in its application to the facts of the case." 
817 P.2d at 819. (Citations omitted, Emphasis added.) 
Appellant has not met his burden of showing the ordinance is 
vague in all its applications therefore the court should find it 
is not unconstitutional on its face. Further it is not vague in 
its application to the facts of this immediate case. The city 
ordinance and state statute both clearly prohibit selling tobacco 
to a minor under 19 years or age. 
It is uncontroverted that Appellant knowingly sold tobacco 
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to Jerren Barson, a boy who was 16 years old. Appellee's 
position is that Appellant knew the boy was not old enough to 
have cigarettes but sold them to him anyway. And that the jury 
believed the boy was telling the truth when he testified that 
Appellant asked him how old he was but he did not respond to the 
question. It is uncontroverted that Appellant did not ask for 
identification to help him make such a determination. 
(Transcript p.102.) Appellant apparently claims he reasonably 
tried to find out the boy's age through questions and was 
satisfied he was old enough. Appellee maintains that the jury 
did not accept this story and found him guilty. 
It is significant that the boy testified he went to 20 
stores, ten on the same day and ten on another day, and attempted 
to purchase cigarettes from all of them—but only one, the 
Appellant—sold to him. (Transcript p.71, 75.) 
IV 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
To make a successful argument based on sufficiency of 
evidence the appellant is obligated to "[1] marshall all the 
evidence supporting the verdict and then [2] demonstrate that, 
even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that 
verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support it." Cambelt 
International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987.) 
Appellant has failed to meet this burden. 
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A. APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHALL ALL THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE JURY VERDICT. 
First, Appellant has failed to marshall all the evidence 
supporting the verdict. Appellee called 4 witnesses: Jerren 
Barson a 16 year-old boy (Transcript p.70-79), Officer J.G. Geier 
(Transcript p.79-87) and Gil Duron (Transcript p.70) of the Logan 
City Police Department and Todd Barson (Transcript p.69) of the 
State Health Department. All four witnesses provided evidence in 
support of the jury verdict. Appellant's brief only discusses 
Jerren Barson in two sentences and a brief mention to J.G. Geier 
in one sentence. (Brief p.40.) 
Appellant has not even provided this court with a complete 
transcript of the testimony of Appellee's witnesses. The 
transcript indicates that Gil Duron and Todd Barson testified but 
their testimony was not transcribed. (p.69-70.) 
The fact that Appellant has failed to provide the court with 
a complete transcript is fatal to his argument here. In Cornish 
Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988),, Roller made an argument 
similar to Appellant's in the immediate case. Like this 
Appellant, Roller did not provide the court with a complete 
transcript. The court stated that, "Rollers have failed to 
provide the Court with the entire transcript of the proceedings 
below. This Court has repeatedly held that an appellant may not 
succeed on a claim of error when relevant portions of the record 
are not before us; in such a case, the proceedings before the 
trial court are presumed to support the trial court's findings. 
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Cornish, 758 P.2d 919, 921. (Emphasis added.) 
B. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT, EVEN VIEWING 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THAT 
VERDICT, THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT IT. 
The Utah Supreme Court said in Cambelt that "The burden on 
an appellant to establish that the evidence does not support the 
jury's verdict and the factual findings implicit in that verdict 
under such a circumstance is quite heavy. We consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we will 
not overturn that verdict when it is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence." 745 P.2d 1239, 1241. Viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict shows the jury 
had a reasonable basis to find Appellant guilty. 
Appellee's witness Jerren Barson testified that "I went up 
there and asked for a pack of Camel Lights and he [Appellant] 
goes, 'are you 19?' And I didn't say nothing. Then he just gave 
them to me with a pack of matches, and then I went back to the 
car." (Transcript p.73.) That testimony, particularly in light 
of what the other witness testified to, remembering that there is 
no transcript of two of the prosecutions witnesses' testimony, is 
substantial and competent and supports the jury verdict. 
Appellant agreed with Jerren's testimony. He agreed that he sold 
the cigarettes to him. He testified that he did not ask for 
verification of his age by requesting to see Jerren Barson's 
drivers license. Appellant's only disagreement is that he said 
Jerren Barson told him he was old enough to purchase the 
cigarettes. (Transcript p.101-02.) Appellant's own testimony 
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supports the verdict of guilty. 
The jury found Appellant guilty of selling tobacco to a 
minor. The evidence supported that finding and this court should 
uphold the verdict. 
V 
APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED WITHIN 30 
DAYS FOLLOWING THE TRIAL. 
Appellant admits in his Brief that he consented to being 
sentenced later than thirty days following the trial. (p.42-43.) 
Appellant then asked to continue the dated set for sentencing 
even further because of a conflict in Appellant's attorney's 
schedule which the court accommodated. Judge Bean explains the 
facts surrounding the sentencing date in his memorandum decision 
attached as an exhibit to Appellant's brief. 
To void Appellant's sentence because of his waiver and then 
the scheduling conflict of his and his own attorney's making 
would not serve justice. The court acted properly in sentencing 
Appellant because of Appellant's waiver to the 30-day period and 
then subsequent motion for continuance. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the conviction of Appellant should 
stand. 
DATED this /2—day of August, 1993. 
£jZnn+± T. ttfyatt 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid to Appellant Lowell 
D. Carlsen at 720 North 400 East, Logan, Utah 84321 this )£-
day of August, 1993. 
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